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Introduction. Death, panic, devastation, segregation, poverty, extreme scarcity,
social disorder, the interruption of everyday life and isolation are some of the dif-
ferent definitions for the plague and plague outbreaks. Omnipresent in Europe
throughout three centuries ever since the Black Death first arrived in southern Italy
in 1347, the plague altered both behaviours and attitudes, ruined powerful masters
and consolidated the assets of religious institutions, destroyed the financial power
of many towns, facilitating the consolidation of royal power there, propitiated
revolts1 and brought about feelings of rejection and condemnation of the poor, pro-
gressively and dangerously associated with the propagation of the disease (Pullan
1994, 101-123; Palmer 1999, 87-101).
Phenomenon of devastating consequences that disorganized the economic and
social life of the people affected for long periods of time (Bourdelais 2003, 27), the
plague epidemics also originated the development of new forms of organization in
the cities it touched, propitiating the constitution of new powers and power groups
that germinated and became stronger in an attempt to fight the disease. The Italian
model – or at least the one shared by most Italian states – for the control and erad-
ication of the plague based on the intervention of central governments, economi-
cally strong and with an already constituted bureaucratic system (Porter 1999, 34-
45), would be subsequently imported to England, some time later to France and
Spain, although in the last two countries the local authorities would play a main role
in the battle against the disease, preceding the intervention of the central govern-
ment, namely through the creation of the so-called ‘Health Boards’ (Cavallo 1995,
44-57). 
What I propose in this paper, after identifying the general guidelines of the
national public assistance system, is to contemplate the Portuguese reality in the
light of the findings of a case study, focused in Évora, between 1579 and 1637.
From the point of view of social history, the main aim of this essay is to evaluate
both the impact that different forms of political interventions achieved in the bat-
tle against the spread of the plague and the efforts to control it. Given their speci-
ficity, once the analysis goes back to the year just before the beginning of the
Spanish rule in Portugal, the chronological scale allows the superposition of sever-
al crisis layouts. Which means that the interventions mentioned here were done by
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the Crown in a context of violent outbreaks of the plague, that occurred in
moments of special difficulty for the royal power: the end of the House of Avis and
the loss of the Portuguese independence (the plague of 1579-1580); the establish-
ment of the Habsburg House and the consolidation of the Spanish authority (the
plague of 1582-1583); the crisis of the last years of the kingdom of Philip II, the
increase of the fiscal pressure and opposition against the ‘invaders’ (the plague of
1598-1603); civil risings and the preliminary steps for the Restoration (the plague of
Malaga, in 1637). Despite the fact that the present study is circumscribed to Évora,
the generalizations proposed in this text are justified by the characteristics of the
system under study. 
The Portuguese assistance system: general characteristics. In the power game, or
rather, in the geography of power, there are distinct intervention areas, defined
according to the political and social specificity of each space. If we take them as a
whole, the assistance and public health problems in Europe during the Early
Modern Period had a tendency to be territorialized, that is to say, much more ori-
entated to the scale of the municipalities than in terms of strategies from the central
governments. In fact, it is in the combination of the measures imposed by public
powers and their capacity to bring about the observance of those measures that the
effective power of a city lies. At the beginning of the 16th century, local authorities
were responsible for the development of new forms of assistance and new sanitary
policies, as well as the stricter control of beggars, making the legislation more rigid,
which, in some cases ended up by banning them.
The specificity of Portugal in this domain results from the fact that the inter-
ventions recorded were determined by the central power and had a national scope
(Abreu 2003a, 5-24). This process started by the end of the 15th century when, by
order of D. Manuel I, the reform of the hospitals (which gave way to the so-called
General Hospitals), the foundation of the Misericórdias (which provided the coun-
try with a network of fraternities specially oriented to help prisoners, poor people
as well as to control the beggars) and the reorganization of institutional assistance
for abandoned children were done.
In short, it was a reorganization of the poor relief and health structures of a wide
spectrum, politically centralized, but that wanted to mobilize the local structures in
order to render them effective and successful. The crown summoned «the best men
of each local», who were already represented at the municipalities, now called to
undertake a new joint project: the Misericórdia ones – brotherhoods that carried a
new idea of piety, trying to revitalize what was known as the ‘spirituality of benefi-
cence’ during the Middle Ages. The Misericórdias would end up, following the deci-
sion of the Cardinal D. Henrique, the last Portuguese king before the Spanish
domain, and that of the Philips (Abreu 2002, 47-77), by centralizing most of the
assistance services, in particular the administration of the hospitals. 
In practical terms, the model of the Misericórdias depending directly from the
Crown presupposed an assistance system run by the people in charge of the local
power but it was linked to ‘the religious doctrine of charity’ that viewed poverty as
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an ideological matter. A system which allowed, for instance, to finance hospitals
with the donations for the celebration of masses in memory of the souls of
Purgatory (Abreu 1999, 153-170). However, as the Misericórdias were not repre-
sented in the political arena – just were confraternities dominated by the local elites –
they did not have an institutional representative sitting at the local governing bod-
ies, thus, cooperation between them and the municipalities was rather exceptional.
Due to this, the municipalities tended to reject any responsibility on those mat-
ters concerning assistance, such as hospitals, and tried not to get deeply involved in
serious financial problems brought about, in most cases, by the system created by
the Crown. This does not mean that the question was left aside completely. There
was in fact an area of intervention that was of their competence: the question of san-
itary policies and the control of epidemics. Therefore, whereas municipalities
enjoyed complete freedom to impose laws compelling to keep cities clean and pre-
serve the hygienic conditions of water (Tavares 1987, 17-32), the decisions to be
taken in case of plague outbreaks or in case of a simple plague threat had to be sanc-
tioned and almost always coordinated by the royal power. The monarch was also
responsible for deciding how to finance such actions, denying, for example, the
right of the municipalities to charge the citizens with specific taxes in order to cover
the expenses caused by the disease. Only under extraordinary circumstances, as was
the case after the epidemic outbreak of 1598, would the king authorized the impo-
sition of taxes on water consumption in order to help the cities face the high
expenses caused by the plague.
Plague, treatment and prevention: different control scales of the plague. The
control of the territory was one of the priorities in times of the plague. Several lev-
els of analysis can be established, and very different or even contradictory interests
can be distinguished. Évora, with a population of approximately 13.000 inhabi-
tants, had specific characteristics in national terms: above all, its aristocratic char-
acter (the court resided there until 16th century), the fact of be the head of the
Archbishopric, and its economic dependency of the migrants, who worked in the
surrounding vineyards and fields. The high walls surrounding it, as was the case in
most important urban centres, functioned as veritable sanitary cordons, a shield
that protected those inside it, but that also hid segregated areas, common in the
urban geography, that were more noticeable when the social differences were
greater. Settings where social tensions and conflicts would arise, the cities were
extremely vulnerable sites, where the precarious balance was disrupted as soon as
the smallest sign of alteration of normality was detected. During the plague, when
the gates of the city were closed in order to prevent their inhabitants from leaving,
the city could turn into a giant prison, felt as a sepulcher by a population that eas-
ily expressed themselves through violence. No wonder then, that one of the main
worries of the authorities, alongside with matters related to public health, was the
control of emotions and disorders when epidemics seemed near. For all these rea-
sons, whenever they faced «the threat of the plague» the cities were the first target
of the coercive actions of politicians.
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The first ones to feel the results of such actions were the people who were infect-
ed by the plague, who were compulsively excluded from the circle of the healthy, in
Évora at least starting since 1480 (Gusmão 1958, 98), exiled from the city and rel-
egated to the so-called houses of health, which were no more than private dwellings
placed away from the city, acquired by the municipality (Gusmão 1969, 291-292)
and transformed into temporary hospitals. Here, as in Lisbon (Rodrigues 1997,
134-135) the intentions of building a permanent hospital for the people infected
with the plague had been foreseen since the 15th century, reaffirming at each out-
break of the plague, but ceasing to be a priority when the epidemic was over. A
behaviour that was not relevant, because the very hospitalization of the patients was
far from a pacific question at that time2.
Since the etiology of the disease (Ridley 2002, 195) was unknown, the treatment
had to be necessarily palliative even though specific ‘medical teams’ were formed
during the times of the plague constituted by a doctor, a chaplain confessor, a prac-
titioner specialized in bleeding, and «as many women as necessary in order to help
the sick». When the proportions of the epidemic grew to larger extents, the court
sent its own doctors so that they assisted their colleagues of the countryside.
Basically, they helped them to weigh up the situation, to draw up an inventory of
the infected and to introduce vigilance and control measures that have already been
referred to by the middle of the 16th century. Yet, there is a scientific achievement
that is worth mentioning: the awareness about the highly infectious character of the
disease, and about the fact that isolating the infected was the best way to avoid con-
tagion. In this sense, quarantines were the most efficient means for its control (Slack
1985), and their absence one of the reasons for the commoners conflicts registered
during the time of the plague as occured in Northern Europe (McNeill 1998, 182).
It was precisely because of the extreme awareness of the epidemic aspect of the
disease and of the precariousness of the means to treat it that those who had enough
economic resources would leave the city, followed by the authorities that had the
obligation to rule it and by those who should have provided spiritual support. The
frequent rage of the population that tried to prevent them from leaving is totally
understandable. This sensation of powerlessness was also shared by the authorities
that, for that same reason, would pay more attention to preventive and prophylac-
tic measures. At the smallest sign of the plague, the city set up its security measures,
a self-protection plan that was imposed by the central government even though in
cooperation with the local authorities. Nothing in Évora suggests a different con-
duct, when we compared it with the behaviour attested for other European cities.
In fact, what is more surprising with regards to the plague is the repetition of the
same moves, the option for the same measures and the adoption of the same restric-
tions everywhere, be it in Venice, Reims, London, Toledo or Évora. Only the times
were different, reflecting the degree of knowledge that the public powers had on
the question. 
In this Portuguese city, the first sanitary measures that refer to the plague came
directly after the outbreak of the last decade of the 15th century, when the protec-
tion of the water supplies was reinforced and was invested in a special body of offi-
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cers who were held responsible for keeping the city clean. However, it is by the
beginning of the 1520’s that a more regular correspondence with regards to the pre-
vention of contagion is discovered between the Crown and the municipality.
Processions were interrupted when the disease broke out, «given that the ill could
mix with the healthy», having no evidence of an opposition on the side of the
Church, as occurred in some other places, reflecting the confrontation between
powers, in this case between political and religious, being the latter the one that felt
affronted and diminished in its thaumaturgy capacities (Soares 1953, 23). At the
same time, the idea that clothes were the main means of contagion spread grew
greater and greater and its control became almost an obsession in the correspon-
dence between the monarch and the municipalities.
By the second half of the century preventive actions were better coordinated
bearing in mind a larger efficiency with regards to the results sought. Among all the
measures undertaken, we must point out the creation of the post of Chief Health
Guard (23rd of July 1569), and the regiment in charge of supervising the access to
the city, known as Regiment of the Gate of Alconchel (1582). Planned to work as
prophylactic measures, their determination were still in force when the plague was
already devastating the city.
The functions of the Chief Health Guard were imported by Portugal from Italy
during the reign of John III3, although with the particularity that it was circum-
scribed in Portugal to the periods of the plague or to those periods when the dis-
ease threatened to spread. This new office implied the organization of a system to
protect the community (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, nº 7, fl. 134) that
consisted basically in the restriction of the accesses and exits from the city, and of
the declaration of that space as an ‘interdicted place’. It was not a simple codifica-
tion and systematization of procedures, as happened in Turin by that time, but the
effective creation of those procedures, although they could eventually include cer-
tain traditional practices. As a relevant feature we should highlight the fact that the
post had to be compulsorily occupied by members of the elite, as in small Italian
cities (Cavallo 1995, 45-46). According to Portuguese documents, noblemen were
more easily respected by the population. As can be clearly inferred from the texts
analyzed, the quick control of panic and general disorientation of the population,
forcing them to comply with the measures imposed by law was as important as the
prevention of the entrance or development of the plague. 
The procedures in case of an outbreak of the plague followed a relatively sim-
ple order, rather similar to what we found in Toledo (Martz 1983, 155): once the
Chief Health Guard was named, he appointed two bailiffs whose duty was to
recruit the men they deemed necessary for the defense of the city (Gusmão 1969,
295-296). The gates were immediately closed, and white flags were hung all along
the walls: a sign that served as a warning that the city was under quarantine and
that, therefore, with restricted access. White were also the staffs that bailiffs carried,
a legitimizing symbol of the power with which the monarch had temporarily 
invested in4.
After this regulation, the abuses ceased to be tolerated and were punished in an
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exemplary way: thus, and apart from the fines imposed, four years of exile overseas
were reserved for those belonging to the elite, while public flogging and two years
of exile at the galley was the punishment for the common people. The town crier
announced these rules from street to street so that no one could plead ignorance of
the law (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, nº 7, fl. 254 and fls. 258-259).
Therefore, it was the Regiment of the Gate of Alconchel that, in 1582, exerted
a tighter control over the city, defining the duties of the Chief Health Guard and of
those working with him with more precision. For practical reasons, the access to the
city was conditioned by whether there was daylight – the gates were opened at 5:00
a.m. and closed at the end of the day – in order to avoid doubts about the phys-
iognomy of the passers-by that were forbidden to crowd around the gates. No
unknown person could enter without being noticed by the watchmen – a nobleman
and a commoner, or two noblemen and three commoners when the situation was
more complex – that had to know what that person was going to do in the city, hav-
ing the power to take anyone who would disobey their orders to prison. Moreover,
people had to show the specific entrance authorization and swear that they had not
been in contact with the plague for the last 20 days. As to those cases that were not
clear, only the Chief Health Guard could give access, and this was conditioned
according to the documents presented. Entrance was utterly forbidden to the poor
who sought the help of the Misericórdia. The letters they carried, that usually permit-
ted them to get alms from the confraternity in order to proceed on their way, were
collected by the guards, who disinfected them and served as middle men between the
poor and the Misericórdia. And if the exit of those who worked outside the city
depended only on their identification, yet the students and merchants were not
allowed to leave «since they had nothing to do in the fields» (Gusmão 1969, 321-324).
Three city noblemen were entrusted with the keys of the gates, which the bailiffs
handed in to them every night. When the epidemic was over, the municipality col-
lected the keys as well as the health flags and the Chief Health Guard and the
bailiffs were suspended. Precariousness in these posts, almost always justified by
the fact that they were highly demanding, would eventually result in the reduction
of both the level of knowledge and the authority of the officers, and therefore of
their efficiency. A completely different situation from many Italian cities, where the
power and prestige of these officers became a normative force within the city
(Cipolla 1979, 25-27).
In brief, if the municipalities were responsible for the organization of everyday
life in each city, in times of crisis, as was the case when the plague broke out, the
Crown would undertake the main role in the reorganization of the urban system,
and not always respecting the decisions of the city councils. Cases such as the Évora
ones are good examples not only of the monarch’s authoritarian power but also of
the cities’ powerlessness to face it. In this sense, control measures against the plague
are also power actions that bring to light the asymmetric relationships between the
protagonists involved. And equally end up reflecting the disorientation of the
Crown with regards to a phenomenon that it was unable to control and to the pres-
sures it had to withstand.
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When in June 1569 Évora was informed that the first symptoms of the plague
had started in Lisbon – «people suffering from swelling and others who would die
from a very fast death» –, the local authorities wrote to the king transmitting their
worries since they could not prevent the noblemen who had escaped from the cap-
ital from entering the city, putting it in danger. Ignoring local authorities, King
Sebastian ordered them to «allow people holding royal provisions to enter», and in
this way opening the city to the powerful and, therefore, to the disease. It was
enough for those granted royal privileges to swear that they came from unimpeded
places and that they did not transport anything liable to transmit the disease
(Gusmão 1969, 293). No longer than a week the monarch changed his attitude and
sent the dispatch ordering the creation of the aforementioned position of Chief
Health Guard, expressing his worries in the preservation of the city against «the
corrupt winds, that are blowing on us at present, God forbid!» (ADE-1, Livro I dos
Originais da Câmara, nº 7, fl. 254, fls. 258-259). During that same week, the daily
average of dead people in Lisbon raised from about 50 to approximately 700. The
members of the ‘scientific community’, so far divided as to the identification of the
disease – as the previous epidemic outbreak had taken place 39 years before it hin-
dered the recognition of the plague symptoms by the younger doctors –, stopped
having doubts as to its origin (Soares 1953, 19-20). As the capital of the kingdom
had been stricken by the disease, the central government was now searching for
shelter in the city that only a few years before had hosted its members, asking the
municipality to be especially careful in the protection of the noblemen who dwelled
there. In fact, the king ordered and ruled according to circumstances and from that
indefiniteness did the future of the population depend on. 
Still, it is true that when comparing the organization against the plague in a
Portuguese city with the generic operative plans used in the rest of Europe, there
don’t seem to be substantial differences between them. The different control levels
were based on progressive complex measures: by the defensive policies established
with the restriction of access to the city making those who arrived show a specific
passport and a compulsory regular inventory of the victims was made; by several
active policies, such as the control and systematic segregation of the infected,
regardless of their social status; by the foundation of hospitals for the infected, the
provision of assistance for the ill with money from the public funds and the destruc-
tion of the properties of the infected; by the institutionalization of the plague con-
trol measures, which presupposed the transformation of the position of Chief
Health Guard into a permanent profession; by the promulgation of an adequate
legislation and, finally, by the coordinated action among the different regions, based
on an information exchange (Dinges 1994, 23). It is true that Évora did not even
start building a hospital for the infected nor did its Chief Health Guard carry out
his functions on a permanent basis. But it was different in Lisbon, where those con-
ditions were soon established.
What seems to be truly a determinant fact was the intervention of the Crown.
And it was not as much due to its novelty since there was a similarity of the English
situation to the Portuguese one, nor even for its efficiency as it happened in France
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in the 17th century (Bourdelais 2003, 48-53), but, on the contrary, due to the dis-
continuous character of the measures adopted as well as to a not very practical ori-
entation. This can be seen, for example, in the information management, once it
was compulsory centralized in the Crown and only later sent to the municipalities.
Thus, for example, when the plague stirred the region of Portalegre (near Évora)
the king’s official informed him about the danger that threatened his jurisdiction
and it was the king who, then, passed this information on to the Évora municipali-
ty. As can be easily deduced from the previous examples, a quick and efficient reac-
tion was not the priority – as was happening in Italy, for example, where informa-
tion exchange would acquire greater relevance (Cipolla 1979), but the pressure
exerted by the political authority upon cities, which also served to reaffirm its pre-
eminence. In the south of Portugal, only in the middle of the 17th century do we
find some evidences of agreements among different municipalities at the level of
information exchange about the advance and backing down movements of the
plague in the neighbouring regions. The fact that the central power was involved in
the process of the restoration of the Portuguese sovereignty (1640) would explain
such a change in attitude. 
Social and political set up of the epidemics or the political stance towards the
plague outbreaks. The final years of the 1570’s and the two following decades,
which correspond from the political point of view to the end of the House of Avis,
the reign of Philip II, and the beginning of the reign of Philip III, represent a com-
plex period open to different interpretations, both with regards to the relationship
that the political power established with the plague, and to the way epidemic out-
breaks were handled. These also imply different interpretations of the exercise of
power in the context of three different social and political situations.
Accompanying how political power was managing those crises, even though there
is only one source of information – the correspondence exchange between the
Crown and the municipality – also means to evaluate the efficiency of such a polit-
ical power and the strength of its controlling bodies, in this particular case, with
regards to the spread of the plague in a time that was, apart from the specificity of
the political situation, also of strong social tensions and serious economic problems.
The first document on the 1579 plague found among the municipality papers
dates back to the 9th of September of that year: it is a letter from the cardinal-king
Henry informing the mayor that the plague had taken over Lisbon and advising
local authorities to reinforce their vigilance on people and goods, namely, on those
coming from the capital, paying special attention to merchants. The city’s defensive
system had to be activated immediately (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, nº
7, fl. 253). The Municipality obeyed, but not without first trying to make the king
assume the responsibility for the nomination of the Chief Health Guard, which he
immediately declined adding that it was the municipalities’ responsibility (Gusmão
1969, 302-303). In October, the Municipality elected both the Chief Health Guard
and the bailiffs, following the regulations of 1569 promulgated by King Sebastian
(ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, nº 7, fl. 134). On the 2nd of January of the
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following year, when the plague preyed upon Lisbon, the King sent several doctors
from the capital to Évora with explicit orders to collaborate with their colleagues.
They should start by first examining the sanitary situation of the city and its out-
skirts and then sending the Crown the corresponding report so that it could act
accordingly. In the same missive, the king also ordered the cleaning of the streets
and the purge of the houses, reinforcing the vigilance at the wall gates and substi-
tuted the Chief Health Guard appointed by the municipality for the External Judge
(ADE-1, Livro 3º de Registo, nº 137, fl. 36v). On the 31st of January 1580 the king
died and the Spanish monarch seemed to occupy the most suitable position in suc-
cession to the Portuguese throne. Chaos took over the country. In March, Lisbon
recognized that Évora was not sufficiently prepared to face the plague crisis. A
problem of even greater dimension given that many noblemen dwelled in the city.
At this point no more references to this matter appear in the municipality’ doc-
uments on the 1579 plague. No demographic records were found for that year,
either. However, there is a valuable contribution by the biographer of the Teotónio
de Bragança, Archbishop of Évora between 1578 and 1602, who by the beginning
of the 17th century wrote: «In 1579, when he became Archbishop, bread was so
scarce in the Alentejo that it caused a great famine in 1580 there, specially in the
city of Évora. This famine was followed by the great and cruel plague that affected
both the city and the Archbishopric […] in May of that same year, for which the
prelate acted in order to provide for the needs of the infected, ordering the build-
ing of a House of Health and giving the necessary instructions for the consecration
of a field to be used as a cemetery, where the dead could be buried» (Nicolau 1614,
47-48).
In short, the city had been alerted to the threat of the plague in September 1579,
therefore, when Lisbon came across its first victims. In October the municipality
had already implanted its preventive plan, which was reinforced in January 1580
with the support sent from the court. However, the death of the king, the Spanish
invasion and the de-structuring of the society, relegated public health matters to a
secondary place. The dimensions of the cataclysm that the plague of 1579-1580 rep-
resented in Portugal reflected the general disorientation that the country was going
through. It is well known that this outbreak of the plague affected different parts of
Europe, yet to different scales but always violent. What is particularly important in
the case of Évora is the fact that the city had been warned against it nine months in
advance. Apart from this, it was when the effects of the epidemic lessened in the cap-
ital that it started to prey upon Évora, repeating the same scenes here that Pêro Roiz
had described for Lisbon in 1569 (Roiz 1953, 20): the plague had fallen on a city
which was already debilitated by a food crisis and provoked such a high number of
deaths that there were not enough cemeteries to bury the dead. And, what may be
even more important, in a city where the municipal power was also debilitated due
to the uncertainties of the country’s political situation.
We do not know how many people died during this outbreak. They were sure-
ly less than 25,000, which is the figure traditionally given for Évora and its outskirts
seeing that it did not have more than 16,000 inhabitants. There is no doubt, how-
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ever, that several thousands must have died, that left the city exhausted through sys-
tematic crises from which it had not recovered completely, becoming a sort of bal-
last and preparing the ground for other maladies, such as the lung diseases that
supervened during the winter of 1580 that probably contributed to the high death
rates (Abreu 2003, 37-60).
Despite the fact that it is chronologically close to the previously mentioned
plague outbreak, the news about the following plague, which took place in 1582,
reveals a completely different political scenery. At the slightest sign of the plague in
Lisbon, on the 19th of January, the central government appointed one of its mem-
bers – from the Desembargo do Paço – for the post of Chief Health Guard in
Évora. The matter, according to the royal missive, was too important to be left in
the hands of the municipality, to whom the king only asked for cooperation (ADE-
1, Livro 6 dos Originais, fl. 139). Ten days later a new royal letter informed that,
according to the information given by the crown official for the region of
Portalegre, «in the outskirts of the aforementioned city plague outbreaks reap-
peared and some people died and others were infected» (Gusmão 1969, 299). The
same letter ordered the municipal authorities to keep alert, to strengthen vigilance
in the city and to deny the entrance to people or clothing from Portalegre or from
any other places considered interdicted (ADE-1, Livro 6 dos Originais, fl. 145). In
February, the municipality was praised for the way it was dealing with the ill who
had been in contact with an infected person from Portalegre and the crown official
must have received orders to return to Lisbon, since the Municipality nominated
one of its members for the post of Chief Health Guard – Manuel Mendes de
Vasconcelos, a Royal House nobleman. The monarch advised him to keep watch on
all the city gates, but the municipality decided to close just one, placing a nobleman
and two common citizens in each of the others in order to keep watch (ADE-1, Livro
4 dos Originais, fls. 13-15). In April, adding that the municipality post and Chief
Health Guard were incompatible given that they were too demanding, the king
substituted Manuel Mendes de Vasconcelos by one of his trustworthy nobleman,
Dom João de Castro (ADE-1, Livro 6 dos Originais, fl. 138), increasing his coercive
powers (ADE-1, Livro 3º de Registo, nº 137, fl. 43). 
We do not know whether the ‘Portalegre plague’ devastated Évora, as there is
nothing that suggests that. Notwithstanding, we know that the city was closed by
order of the king, once, in November, he authorized the removal of the health flags,
as he considered that the plague was not causing any more deaths in Portugal and
Castile (ADE-1, Livro 3º de Registo, fl. 54, 23rd of November 1582). 
In fact, what we have found here is the intervention of a strong power, that
explicitly assumes the organization of the operations, not only giving precise
instructions to the municipality, praising it whenever he considers fit, but also sub-
stituting the local power in the nomination of the Chief Health Guard, appointing
trustworthy people for this post. This was a very relevant strategy as it guaranteed
the observance of the royal discipline in the city. Bearing in mind that the
Regulations of the Gate of Alconchel were elaborated and approved in that same
year of 1582. 
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And it was this same government that, imposing models of behaviour and
affirming its political-institutional power, accuses the municipality, in March 1583,
of «not having carried out a good plan to protect the city against the plague»,
reminding it that it had to protect its noblemen and warned of the great inconve-
nience for the country if the city was declared interdicted. In consonance with the
stance taken the previous year, the king immediately appoints the Chief Health
Guard, choosing one of the most remarkable noblemen of the city, who, according
to him, had the necessary authority to impose the adequate measures. In June 1583,
when Évora was traversed by rumours about the plague that was devastating
Cordoba and Seville, the municipality was forced to ban the entrance to people and
goods coming from the aforementioned Spanish territories by the central govern-
ment (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, livro 5, fl. 24v). Given the serious-
ness of the news from Andalusia, the monarch asked his official to intervene, order-
ing him to take direct participation in the vigilance of his administrative area, and
be strict in forbidding the entrance to people and clothes from the infected places
as well as from the Algarve, where many cities were already in quarantine (ADE-1,
Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, livro 5, fl. 27). The municipality also banned
innkeepers from hosting people or acquiring goods from Cordova and Seville,
under the penalty of 50 cruzados and two years of exile in Africa, and the same pun-
ishment would be applied to whoever maintained commercial exchange with those
places (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originais da Câmara, livro 5, fl. 22). As it seems Évora
managed to escape from the plague once again, and concerning the plague the doc-
uments only refer to the one which started in 1598 and lasted until the beginning
of the following century. 
Nevertheless, the absence of information on the epidemic outbreaks is com-
pensated with a set of data, simultaneously of soon relief and public health charac-
ter, which reveal the development of a coordinated action by the different political
figures during the last two decades of the 16th century in order to profit as much
as possible from all the efforts done in those fields. Apart from the aforementioned
actions of Philip II, who also intervened on the Misericórdias reinforcing their com-
petences, we should highlight the intervention of the Archbishop Teotónio de
Bragança, mentor of a global reform programme of the city’s assistance structures5.
Several indicators prove that these matters were dealt with in a rational way, which
might have probably resulted in a better protection of the city. Namely, due to the
control exerted over the poor and the prohibition against non-authorized beggary6.
Still, as is well known, the last years of the reign of Philip II underwent serious
problems, which also had negative effects on the public health. In fact, it is already
a debilitated monarchy that tries to solve the subsistence crises that the country was
undergoing since 1596, and the plague that comes from Galicia in 1598, probably
with the wheat that the municipality had ordered from Spain in order to provide
for the city’s needs (Santos 1995, 243; ADE-1, Livro 8, Vereações, fl. 4v.). The royal
missive that the municipality gets on the 22nd of May 1599 – the first document
found referring to this epidemic outbreak – is well clarified with regards to the sit-
uation of the city. Évora was being besieged for more than a year and inside it the
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poor and the ill were so numerous that the municipality declared itself impotent to
handle them. Given the attraction it exerted upon immigrants, Évora might have
received, as well as Lisbon, great amounts of starving people who left their lands
seeking for shelter in cities. In brief, Évora was going through great punishments
«namely, of hunger, the plague and war which our Lord has been sending upon us
for so many years now», quoting Teotónio de Bragança (Santos 1995, 216). A dis-
course that could also be applicable to Spain, where the plague that was spreading
ever since 1596, was leaving deep scars (Perez Moreda, 1980, 247-251, 261). 
For the first time in Évora, but in the sequence that was determined for Lisbon,
the central government reacted imposing extraordinary taxes – a specific tax on
water charged when meat and wine was consumed – in order to make up for the
expenses deriving from the plague (ADE-1, Livro 7º dos Originais, n° 77, fl. 382).
The situation was so serious that, according to a letter of the king dated 3rd of
August, it justified the fact that no one was exempt from the new tax, not even those
who were traditionally such as the University or the religious institutes (ADE-1,
Livro 7º dos Originais, n° 77, fl. 383). By the end of the month, the tax was extend-
ed to olive oil consumption (ADE-1, Livro 7º dos Originais, n° 77, fl. 388) still it
seemed as though the plague was not willing to abandon the city. This time, con-
trarily to what usually happened, the central government had not been the first to
contact the municipality, instead, it had been the municipality that in desperation
had asked for help. As an answer, on the 17th of July 1600, Lisbon sent António de
Carvalho, nobleman of the Royal House, Magistrate of the Court and Judge of the
Treasury, so that he would act as Chief Health Guard in Évora (ADE-1, Livro 3º de
Registo, n° 137, fl. 252v). Analyzing the situation, royal help arrived nearly two
years after the epidemic outbreak had started. And even though the city was
declared out of danger in the same month as the representative of the king assumed
his duties (ADE-1, Livro 3º de Registo, nº 137, fl. 253), that were less related to the
efficiency of the official than to the fact that he had happened to arrive when the
crisis had almost finished. 
The city would go back to normality slowly, although temporary plague out-
breaks kept reappearing at least until 1603 (ADE-1, Livro I dos Originaisa, n° 71, fl.
132), for six consecutive years – as had happened in Lisbon before. Once again, the
question of the construction of the house of health for «the infected with the
plague» mentioned before was raised but again aborted after the crisis. 
From this moment on, and practically until the end of the Philips’ government,
no records on the plague appear in the documents, and it remains unknown
whether or not the epidemic outbreaks that had spread in Lisbon from the begin-
ning of the 1630’ s affected Évora too. Yet, in 1637, a document of special interest
appears: the municipality receives a royal letter, dated the 23rd of June, which con-
tains detailed information on how local authorities had to react with regards to the
letters. Obviously the missive was about the plague. Devastating Malaga at that
moment, the viceroy, the princess Margaret, showed concern in the protection of
Évora as well as with the measures to be taken with regards to the people that
arrived from Malaga (ADE-1, Livro 5 de Registos, nº 139, fls. 325-328). She advised
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the municipality to react «with such violence and quickness in order to avoid any
risk and danger that might be caused by the foresaid people». Both, seaports and
the inland borders were already under watch but what was necessary now was to
prevent the spread of the epidemics through the correspondence, «as paper is one
of the things that most easily receives the contagion» (ADE-1, Livro 5 de Registos, no
139, fls. 34-35v). In order to avoid it, very strict details were given about how to col-
lect and examine the letters, and then treat them with vinegar and fire. 
None of these measures constituted, as is well known, a novelty to control the
spread of the plague. Yet, what should be highlighted in this document is not the
emphasis given to the paper as a plague transmitter, but the judicial measures that
would accompany the search and disinfections of those letters, for which the pres-
ence of a royal officer and a Health Provider was required. Moreover, it was
referred that much care should be taken so as not to loose any sheet of paper.
Not doubting the public health questions that can be present in such a con-
cerned intervention of the royal power (even if it was not so active in other cir-
cumstances in which the plague had approached the city even more), still it admits
different interpretations, more compromised with the political situation at that
moment. This is because it is necessary to remember that, at the same time, the
opposition against the Spanish domination was expanding in Portugal, and acquir-
ing really worrying dimensions that would give way to popular risings, which would
lead to the Restoration of Independence in 1640. In 1637 Évora was the first city to
revolt, stirring up the spark that would burn the whole country (Oliveira 2002, 263-
274). Writings were, precisely, one of the ways whereby the revolt spread (Pardal
2003, 169-170). Writings that were anonymous, strongly critical and, of course,
known by the authorities. In this sense, trying to avoid the entrance of the plague
in Évora by controlling the correspondence could very well serve to avoid the
spreading of other evils that were equally dangerous and highly contagious.  
Final considerations. The information we have about the different plague out-
breaks that preyed upon Évora between 1579 and 1637 is neither particularly rich
nor especially innovative. Still, given its chronological range and the political char-
acter that is easily recognizable in the crown decisions with regards to the plague
and to the preventive and prophylactic measures planned, this matter seemed to be
an interesting area of study. In fact as far as the spread of the epidemic was con-
cerned, the population was better protected while the political power was strong
and centralized, able to impose its power over the city, preventing it to rule its own
destiny in this one as well as in other areas. On the contrary, whenever the royal
power revealed itself weaker and more fragile, the plague invaded the city without
control, leaving deep marks, which were difficult to erase. 
It is true that the proofs that fundament this sentence are more of a qualitative
nature rather than quantitative and reflect more the emotion than an exact and
rational reaction of the events. From the point of view of the historic analysis, the
evaluation of the demographic effects of these successive crises is irrevocably com-
promised by the type of existing documental sources which are more of a qualita-
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tive rather than quantitative nature and reflect more the emotion than an exact and
rational reaction before the events. The three nucleous that make it possible for us
to obtain some information on the population – the Parish and the Hospital do
Espírito Santo records as well as the burials of the poor done by the Santa Casa da
Misericórdia – are characterized by the chronologic discontinuity and almost
absence of information for the plague times. As, for example, in relation to the
plague of 1579-1580: we know that less than 25,000 people died, as the coeval texts
show but, surely, too many, which could have been avoided if the political situation
were not of total disorientation before an empty throne and the threat of a ‘foreign
occupation’. Notwithstanding, it was this same power which, through accurate and
efficient measures, but indisputably autocratic, stopped the plague from entering
the city in 1582 and in 1583.
We are better informed, however, about the demographic behaviour of the fol-
lowing decades. The parish records, our main source, are precarious and must be
taken with the necessary precautions, especially due to the sub-register of the death
certificates and the disappearance of the documentation of the biggest of the four
parishes. Besides all these limitations, the rise in the number of deaths during the
plague outbreaks at the end of the 16th century is undeniable when compared to the
previous years. For example, in the second biggest parish in the city – S. Mamede
– the annual average of 16 deaths climb to 46 during the plague crises of 1598.
Something similar occurs in Santo Antão, which soars from 26 annual deaths to 51
in the same year. 
But these deaths cannot be considered directly brought on by the plague but as
its immediate consequence. Because the plague patients were expelled out of the
city walls, where temporary hospitals were built for them. The ones that died were
buried in common graves as far as possible from the city, without any quantitative
control. Obviously some patients managed to elude the authorities by hiding in the
city. But it seems to be more acceptable to conclude that the increases in the num-
ber of deaths in the two above mentioned parishes are more related to hunger,
amongst other reasons, resulting from the quarantine imposed on the city rather
than the epidemic itself. A conclusion that is supported on the database that keeps
the number of entries in the Hospital do Espírito Santo. In this hospital plague
patients or of any other contagious diseases were not admitted. 
However, the numbers of entries soar in the years following the plague out-
break: identified as ‘poor’ or ‘workers’, we know that they were people without
resources that looked for the necessary support for survival at the hospital. It is this
same explanation – hunger – that we find for the deaths registered in the second
and third decades of the 17th century (the parish of Santo Antão reached more than
80 deaths per year in that time) and for the number of funerals that the confrater-
nity of Misericórdia buried annually. The last ones especially high between 1631
and 1632 (458 burials in the first year, 820 in the second, when the annual average
was below 300), a result, partly, from the extraordinary increase of patients that
were admitted to the Hospital do Espírito Santo. To the collapse of cereal produc-
tion due to torrential rain, the successive raises of taxes were added, before the
122
L A U R I N D A A B R E U
growing aggressiveness of the undernourished population that screamed, uncon-
trollably, to the local power: «people are poor and cannot bear new taxes». 
The worsening of the life conditions, due to the taxes and also from the long-
lasting droughts (1635-1637) that drastically affected the cereal production, made
the revolts permanent and justifies the central government precautions throughout
the plague rumors, in 1637. Once again, the plague was seen as a political issue.
This time, however, with different aims and with final results that, for certain, went
beyond the Habsburg monarchy’s expectations. 
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1 Almost always due to famine. All the most
serious plagues that occurred in Portugal –
1569 (the Great Plague – the most serious epi-
demic outbreak after the Black Death); 1579-
83; 1598-1603, decade of the 1630’s – were
preceded by severe crises that, in turn, gener-
ated strong social disorders. 
2 In the words of Jean-Noel Biraben (1975, 1,
173) «L’entassement des malades pendant les
grandes poussées épidémiques est constam-
ment évoqué par les textes, qu’il s’agisse des
grands hôpitaux urbains ou des modestes
infirmeries provisoires. On comprend qu’en
1606 le médecin espagnol Alonzo de Freylas,
dans son traité sur la peste, discute des avan-
tages et des inconvénients du traitement à
l’hôpital ou à domicile, et pense qu’en période
de grande épidémie la concentration en hôpital
favorise le mal… sans compter, la masse du
linge des pestiférés».
3 The first Chief Health Provider, the magis-
trate Pedro Vaz, was appointed on the 27th of
September 1526. He had previously been to
Rome, Milan and Florence first in order to
learn what kind of measures against the epi-
demic outbreaks had been taken there (Serrão
1980, 356). 
4 Specific nominations for the bailiff post are
only found for the 17th century (ADE-1, Livros
dos Originais da Câmara, nº 17, fl. 128; livro 18,
cc. 135-136; book 19, fl. 32v and book 18, fl.
145v-146).
5 His intervention would give way to the
Hospice of S. Manços – for girls from the high-
er layers of society –, the Hospice of Santa
Marta – for female sinners – and the Piedade
Brotherhood and Hospice, a hospice for the
poor – who sought salvation through work –
which was designed and administered accord-
ing to the guidelines established by Miguel de
Giginta in his Memorial [...] and, mainly, in his
Tratado de Remédio de pobres (1579). 
6 In Évora, as was the case in Rouen, where in
1590 the public powers of both cities behave
almost in the same way with regards to this
problem (Pullan, 1994, 292) and, for Évora,
edict of the 1st of June 1590 (BPE-1), and also
edict of the 4th of March 1604 (BPE-2).
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Summary
The city in times of the plague: preventive and eradication measures against epidemic outbreaks in
Évora between 1579 and 1637
The political and economic context of Portugal of the beginning of the Early Modern Period and
the absence of intermediary powers between the Crown and the municipalities facilitated a direct
intervention of the central power on the poor relief, health care and public health mechanisms.
Since the end of the 15th century, a set of social policies, with a national scope, came up from the
emergent Early Modern State with the objective to uniform charitable practices and to endow the
country with the same assistance institutions. The reform of the hospitals and the creation of a net
of royal confraternities (the confraternities of Misericórdia – more than 300 spread throughout
Portugal and its colonies in 1640), based on the same rules and with the same competences – to
care for the poor, the prisoners, the sick, among other mercy works – are the most known actions
of these centralized policies. This paper demonstrates that the Portuguese Crown also wanted to
control the epidemics policies, making the municipalities totally dependent on the kings’ orienta-
tions.  The results of such an attitude are quite obvious: when the central political power was
strong, it was able to impose its authority over the cities, compelling them to protect the popula-
tion according to the Lisbon rules. On the contrary, whenever the royal power was weak and more
fragile, the plagues spread without any control. The case of Évora presented here is an example
that illustrates both situations.  
Riassunto
La città e la peste: misure di prevenzione e di eliminazione delle pestilenze in Evora, 1579-1637 
Il contesto politico ed economico del Portogallo all’inizio dell’età moderna e l’assenza di poteri
d’intermediazione tra la Corona e le singole comunità facilitarono interventi diretti del potere cen-
trale a sollievo della povertà e della sanità pubblica. Già dalla fine del XV secolo, nel quadro del-
l’emergente modernizzazione dello Stato, prese l’avvio una serie di politiche sociali per diffonde-
re e uniformare a livello dell’intero Paese gli interventi di beneficenza e di assistenza. I più noti
risultati di questa nuova politica centralizzata furono quelli concernenti la riforma degli ospedali
e la creazione di un sistema di confraternite reali (le confraternite della Misericordia – più di 300
erano attive nel 1640 in Portogallo e nelle colonie), basate sulle stesse regole e con le stesse com-
petenze, per  fornire, in particolare, assistenza ai poveri, ai prigionieri, ai malati.
In questo contributo si mette in evidenza come la Corona avesse anche come fine quello del
controllo delle epidemie, rendendo le singole comunità totalmente dipendenti dai voleri del sovra-
no. I risultati sono piuttosto ovvii: quando il potere centrale era forte era anche in grado di impor-
re la propria autorità su tutte le comunità, costringendole ad attuare le politiche a protezione della
popolazione emanate da Lisbona. Quando, invece, il potere reale era debole e più fragile, l’epide-
mia si diffondeva senza controllo. Il caso di Evora, qui descritto, è un esempio di questa duplice
situazione.  
